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CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Dr HANS STEINMU¨LLER
Chinese migrants and labourers have been in Latin America
for several centuries, and both the People’s Republic of China
and Taiwan have had political and trade relations with the
countries on the continent for decades. However, Chinese
involvement in the continent has broadly increased during
the last decade. Both Latin American countries and China
recovered relatively quickly from the global financial crisis of
2008, and since then have deepened existing trade relations.
Additionally, Chinese investment in the region has increased
rapidly and is now funding numerous development projects.
Chinese trade with Latin America is largely focused on agri-
cultural and mineral products; Chinese investment also
focuses on raw materials, often accompanied by infrastructure
projects. This essay first presents some background of the
current relations between China and Latin America. It then
describes current economic and political developments, and
focuses on the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese involvement on
the continent, specifically the synergy and potential conflict of
Chinese and Latin American interests in the exchange of
natural materials for investment in infrastructure. The final
section discusses mutual perceptions and provides a cautious
prospect for further developments.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Chinese presence in Latin America dates back to the 16th
century, when maritime commerce mainly between the ports of
Manila and Acapulco brought Chinese products and people to
the then viceroyalty of New Spain (Slack, 2010). Called
‘Sangleys’ by the Spaniards, Chinese Mestizos (i.e. of mixed
indigenous and Spanish descent) from the Philippines came as
sailors, slaves and servants to New Spain before Mexican
independence. In the 19th century indentured Chinese labour-
ers were forced to work in several Latin American countries,
especially in the cotton and sugar plantations of Cuba and the
mines and guano industry of Peru. The history of this ‘coolie
trade’ (using the name given to the indentured labourers) is
characterized by violent exploitation; but the coolies’ marriage
with local women led to the formation of the first Chinese Latin
American communities (Lai and Tan, 2010). Small groups of
refugees from the Nationalists (Kuomintang) arrived in Latin
America after their defeat by the Chinese Communist Party on
the mainland in 1949; since then there have been some
Taiwanese communities, for instance in Ciudad del Este in
Paraguay and in Buenos Aires in Argentina (Trejos and
Chiang, 2012). Aside from Cuba, no Latin American nation
recognized the People’s Republic of China, which was estab-
lished in 1949. China’s break with the USSR in the 1960s, and
the rapprochement of China and the USA, was followed by the
formal establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of
Latin American countries in the early 1970s, including Argen-
tina, Chile, Mexico and Peru. However, the largest tide of
Chinese involvement in the continent has occurred in the last
10 years. China has become the largest trade partner of Brazil,
Chile and Peru, and a very important trade partner of most
other Latin American nations. Ecuador and Peru are the main
destinations of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in
mineral resources (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012: 45); in these coun-
tries and elsewhere, Chinese mining projects are often coupled
with large-scale infrastructure development undertaken by
Chinese state-owned enterprises. Chinese businesses are
investing in many different industries in Latin America,
small-scale entrepreneurs are opening internet cafe´s and
supermarkets all over the region, government enterprises
are investing in oil extraction in the Amazon, and China is
preparing to host annual meetings with the representatives of
most Latin American nations and regional groups.
The rapid pace of Chinese investment in the region has
sometimes led to the impression that there is an insurmount-
able gap between Chinese strategies and the established
practices of Western governments and companies. It is import-
ant to bear in mind that Chinese involvement in Latin America
has been part of the wider strategy of ‘going out’, which is
accompanied by an internationalization of the Chinese state
and companies; in this process, Chinese companies are adjust-
ing their practices to those of international competitors (Gon-
zalez-Vicente, 2011). Hence, Chinese government agencies
and corporations are also adjusting their strategies in certain
ways to the situation in their respective host countries. Since
the so-called era of ‘reform and opening’ began in the 1980s,
Chinese investment, migration and political involvement has
become widely felt almost everywhere in the world. China’s
rising global influence is clearly articulated with domestic
developments: the relaxation of political control and the
encouragement of local entrepreneurship since the 1980s,
the opening of special economic zones, and the continuing
state-ownership of strategic industries (especially in energy
and infrastructure) are the background against which Chinese
investment and migration abroad is taking place. Since the
southern tour of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the
rapid privatization of state assets and state-led capitalist
development in the People’s Republic was accompanied by a
surge of Chinese investments abroad. In 1999 the Government
announced its ‘going out’ policy to support and increase
Chinese investments abroad. Aside from balancing China’s
huge foreign exchange reserves, one important target of this
strategy is to equip Chinese companies with the skills and
experience to compete with global competitors, who are
already operating in China. Following these changes, the
developing world has become a major focus of China’s foreign
policy. Chinese involvement in Africa has been a focus of
interest for Western journalists and academic observers
(see, for instance, Alden, 2007; Rotberg, 2008; Raine, 2009).
Similar developments have taken place elsewhere, and to some
extent Chinese involvement in Latin America is comparable to
China’s relations with African countries (Alden, 2012). As in
Africa, one particular interest of Chinese government and
business in Latin America is to satisfy the country’s increasing
demand for oil, minerals, copper, iron and other metals. Partly
in exchange for access to mineral resources and primary
products, Chinese companies and government agencies have
invested widely in infrastructure projects in Latin America.
Chinese firms have received numerous contracts for road
construction, and are involved in large hydro-electrical pro-
jects, oil production and mining extraction across the contin-
ent. The emerging literature on China in Latin America points
to these core features of resource interest and Chinese invest-
ment (Cesarin and Moneta, 2005; Gallagher and Porzecanski,
2010; Armony and Strauss, 2012).
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
While China’s trade volume with Latin America is still far
lower than its trade with Asian countries, the People’s Repub-
lic has already become the largest trading partner of Brazil,
Chile and Peru. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Devel-
opment, Industry and Foreign Trade, Brazil’s bilateral trade
with China grew by 10% in 2013 to reach US $83,300m. (Toh,
2014). A large part of Latin American exports to China are
primary products, such as copper, iron ore, soy and oil. In 2009
agriculture and mining sector goods constituted 83% of Latin
American exports to China (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010).
Some observers predict that China will overtake the European
Union (EU) as Latin America’s second largest trade partner in
2016 (Toh, 2014), and some predict that it might eventually
surpass the USA as Latin America’s largest trading partner in
about 15 years (Hakim and Myers, 2014).
By global region, Latin America was the second largest
target of Chinese overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI)
in 2011, receiving 13% of Chinese OFDI following Asia’s 71.4%.
However, 92% of Chinese OFDI to Latin America went to the
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, and for a more
balanced view of Chinese FDI to Latin America these two tax
havens will henceforth be excluded from our analysis. Of the
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remaining FDI, large parts went to Brazil, Peru, Venezuela
and Argentina, which are the main recipients of Chinese FDI in
the region (Chen and Pe´rez Luden˜a, 2013). Chinese companies
play an important role in the oil and gas industry of several
countries, and in the mining sector in others (specifically Brazil
and Peru). The largest investments outside the natural
resources sector have been to Brazil, where several Chinese
manufacturers and at least one provider of electricity services
operate. At the same time other countries, such as Chile and
Mexico, have not yet received significant amounts of FDI from
China. While Chinese FDI to the region has grown exponen-
tially, China’s overall share of FDI to Latin America is less than
7%, and thus far behind that of the USA and the EU, which,
respectively, provide 25% and 40% of FDI to the region (Chen
and Pe´rez Luden˜a, 2013: 11).
In terms of trade and FDI, agriculture plays an important
role for China in Latin America. Rapid urbanization and the
effects of desertification and environmental pollution in China
itself, together with concerns about volatility in food prices,
have led Chinese government agencies and enterprises to
search for investment opportunities in agricultural production
and markets abroad. Aside from other staple crops, China has
become a major importer of soy from Latin America. Agricul-
ture-related involvement in Latin America is still mainly
limited to trade; there has been much less investment in
agriculture or so-called ‘land-grabs’ as has sometimes been
suggested in the Western media (Myers, 2013).
Together with increased volumes of trade and FDI, China
has also become a major provider of loans to Latin American
countries. Chinese banks have issued more than US
$100,000m. since Chinese lending to the region began in
2006. Recent estimates indicate a major increase in Chinese
lending to Latin American countries in 2013, after a consid-
erable slump in 2012 (Irwin and Gallagher, 2014). Chinese
banks have emerged as an important alternative for Latin
American countries, specifically for those that are considered
high risk on global capital markets. These include the Gov-
ernments of Venezuela and Argentina, which were the prin-
cipal recipients of Chinese loans in 2013, with volumes of
$50,600m. and $14,100m., respectively, since 2006.1
MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS AND INTERESTS
From a Chinese perspective, there are a number of core inter-
ests in Latin America: the region is a major provider of raw
materials and an emerging market for China’s manufactured
products. Aside from these economic interests, the Chinese
Government also has a number of geopolitical and strategic
interests in the region, which include the search for allies that
support China’s position in international negotiations, includ-
ing over its contentious relationship with Taiwan and possibly
the limitation of US influence in Latin America (Ellis, 2009: 14-
15; Leiteritz, 2012: 68).
Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) discuss the tension
between the first two interests and the potentially negative
consequences for Latin American industrialization. If, in the
short term, it seems that Chinese demand for primary products
has only positive consequences for Latin America, ultimately,
it might just extend the resource curse that has been haunting
Latin American countries for decades, if not centuries. Add to
this the fact that China is providing huge amounts of cheap
manufactured products to the region, and it is clear that the
prospects from this relationship are not necessarily optimal for
Latin American industrialization and indigenous
development.
Of specific interest is also the relationship between China
and the long-standing interests of the USA in the region. A
number of scholars have analysed these relationships as a
‘triangle’ of Latin American countries, the USA and China (see,
for instance, Stallings, 2008, and the contributions to Dussel
Peters et al, 2013). However, the notion of a ‘triangle’ should
be cautioned for a number of reasons: specifically, it might
suggest a unity of interests for Latin American countries
which is actually absent, and it might neglect other important
countries which play important roles in Latin America
(Ellis, 2012).
There is actually much diversity in the positions of Latin
American nations towards the USA and China. Chile and Peru,
for instance, have negotiated bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs) with both the USA and China (Chile concluded its FTA
with the USA in 2004 and with China in 2006; Peru signed
FTAs with both countries in 2009). In both cases, the FTAs
concluded with China focus on the ‘old trade agenda’ of extend-
ing the product lines of liberalized trade, tariff and market
access; by contrast, the agreements of both countries with the
USA cover the ‘new trade agenda’, including investment,
services, trade-related intellectual property rights, competi-
tion and trade facilitation (Wise, 2012). In terms of foreign
policy, China’s approaches in Latin America can be broadly
contrasted with those of the USA. Relations between the USA
and Latin America have been traditionally characterized by
the exercise of ‘hard power’, in the form of interventions,
threats and the provision of financial and technical assistance
with conditions attached for the recipient countries. The USA
has, for instance, intervened more or less directly in left-
leaning coups d’e´tat in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973);
in recent decades the exercise of ‘hard power’ can be seen in the
employment of ‘sticks and carrots’ in trade relations (Dunker-
ley, 2008). The Chinese approach, in contrast, generally sticks
to the principle of non-interference, in which trade agreements
and development assistance have ‘no strings attached’. Chi-
nese ‘soft power’ is very attractive to some Latin American
regimes, especially when compared with the more restrictive
US foreign policy. While the USA limited its relations with the
left-leaning regimes of President Evo Morales in Bolivia and
the late President Hugo Cha´vez in Venezuela, China invited
both leaders for official state visits to Beijing. It remains to be
questioned, however, how far the attraction of Chinese ‘soft
power’ will go for Latin American citizens and governments
(Leiteritz, 2012).
One core issue in China’s relationship with Latin America is
the contentious status of Taiwan. Currently, 12 of the 22
countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan are
from Latin America and the Caribbean. Aside from Paraguay,
they are all located in Central America and the Caribbean
(Belize, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Chris-
topher and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the Grena-
dines). While both China and Taiwan have used ‘chequebook
diplomacy’ to gain support from Latin American nations, in the
last decade China has successfully convinced both Dominica
(in 2004) and Costa Rica (in 2007) to switch their allegiances; in
both cases, the offer of significant aid packages, preferential
trade agreements and infrastructure projects played a consid-
erable role in the decision (Ellis, 2010).
The Taiwan issue is very important, but China is also looking
for allies more broadly in the international arena. Building on
its economic collaboration with Brazil, there have been some
strategic partnerships in World Trade Organization negoti-
ations between China and Brazil, for instance, sometimes
including the other two so-called BRIC nations, Russia and
India.
On the Latin American side, there are a number of different
views of China, its recent development and its involvement in
the region. While, on the one hand, China is a new actor on the
international scene, which might not come with the ‘baggage’ of
the historical relations with Europe and the USA, on the other
hand, the particularity of the ‘China Model’ comes with a
particular set of problems. If China offers a different paradigm
of modernity without the memories of colonialism and imperi-
alism, at the same time this ‘modernity without enlighten-
ment’ might also further accentuate the unsettled problems of
democracy and development in Latin American countries. In
the rapidly increasing coverage of China in Latin American
news outlets, one discovers not only predictable condemnation
of human rights abuses and lack of democratic governance, but
there is also some sense of confusion about the relative success
of the ‘China Model’ and what it could mean for Latin America.
In an analysis of China coverage in two major Colombian
newspapers, Armony (2012) reveals precisely the Janus face of
China’s image in Latin America, which combines suspicion and
admiration. At the same time, the discussions about China and
Chinese investment in Latin America are becoming increas-
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ingly diverse and sophisticated, and the view that Chinese
investment would favour illiberal and non-democratic settings
is certainly too simplistic.
If we take Chinese investments in mining and energy as an
example, there is a common view that Chinese companies
prefer non-democratic policy contexts. For Chinese mining
investment in Latin America, specifically in Ecuador and Peru,
however, this is not the case. It has been shown that Chinese
mining investments favour liberal investment regimes and
relative political stability, and in these preferences Chinese
mining companies are not very different from their Western
counterparts. Additional factors which play important roles in
Chinese investment decisions are the existing business rela-
tions and the presence of a Chinese community in the host
country. Chinese FDI in mining is best understood in terms of
individual mining companies in specific local settings, rather
than a specific national strategy imposed by the Chinese
Government. However, there are certain differences in the
receptivity of Chinese companies to demands from civil society.
Given that Chinese energy companies are to a large extent
owned and controlled by government agencies, they do not rely
on stock markets and shareholders, and their management is
therefore less dependent on, and responsible to, outside
demands (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2012). At the same time, several
Chinese companies have made their first attempts at entering
into a dialogue with civil society representatives, sometimes
including representatives of indigenous peoples (for instance
in Ecuador). The results need to be judged on a case-by-case
basis, and in contexts where numerous multinational extrac-
tive industries operate (such as in Chile and Peru); it is far from
certain that Chinese business practices are causing higher
social and environmental costs when compared with other
multinationals.
Anti-Chinese sentiment and protest is growing in some
countries, and there are serious discussions about the benefits
and pitfalls of China’s relations with Latin America. Mexican
manufacturers, for example, find it difficult to compete with
cheaper Chinese imports, and these concerns have led in some
cases to an antagonistic presentation of Chinese entrepreneurs
in local media and sometimes also to acts of aggression against
Chinese business (Hearn, 2012). The Government of Cuba,
which still retains broad control over its national economy, has
stepped up its efforts to centralize the commercial regulation of
Chinese business, specifically the informal businesses in
Havana’s Chinatown (ibid).
Against the sometimes negative perceptions of cheap Chi-
nese imports, irresponsible Chinese investors and an auto-
cratic Government, China has intensified its ‘soft power’ efforts
on the continent. Student exchanges, cultural diplomacy and
the establishment of so-called Confucius Institutes play
important roles here. Since 2004 hundreds of such institutes
have been established all over the world in order to promote
Chinese culture and language. The Confucius Institutes are
under the supervision of the ‘Han Ban’, the Language Council
affiliated to the Chinese Ministry of Education. Since 2004 at
least 20 Confucius Institutes have been established in 11 Latin
American countries, each of them affiliated to a local univer-
sity, and in partnership with a Chinese university.
High-profile state visits are another major strategy. Soon
after US President Barack Obama and Vice-President Joe
Biden travelled to five Latin American countries (Costa Rica,
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago) in May
2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited three of the same
countries in June: Costa Rica, Mexico, and Trinidad and
Tobago. Notwithstanding China’s increased ‘soft power’ meas-
ures and influence in the region, the perception in most Latin
American countries still ranks China and the Chinaese model
as secondary for the continent, when compared with the USA.
A poll of 40,000 participants in various Latin American coun-
tries found that a majority of 56.0% responded that they
trusted the USA, while 50.8% of participants said that they
trusted China. Similarly, when asked ‘which country has the
most influence in the region’, 40.8% of the participants said the
USA, against 20.3% which answered China (Azpuru and
Zechmeister, 2014).
CONCLUSIONS
During the last decade China’s influence in Latin America has
grown exponentially. Measured in terms of trade volumes and
FDI, China has established close ties with a number of Latin
American nations. However, overall trade volumes are still
small when compared to China’s trade with Asia, Europe and
North America. China’s relationship with Latin America is
characterized to a large extent by China’s interest in raw
materials and access to Latin American markets. As has been
discussed, some countries have been able to benefit from this
relationship; however, it also comes with certain risks, espe-
cially for Latin America’s own manufacturing industries. Calls
for the diversification of Chinese trade and investment have so
far only led to limited changes; moreover, the possibilities for
manufactured goods from Latin America to enter the Chinese
market also remain limited.
While China has not yet overtaken the USA in terms of trade
ties and political influence in the region, its growing links with
the region, interest in raw materials and markets, and high
degree of political engagement will demand continuous atten-
tion in the future. In terms of mutual perceptions, there have
been also rapprochements between Latin America and China.
Latin America, to some degree like Africa, presents a number of
opportunities for China; yet there are also risks and potential
misunderstandings. From the perspective of Latin Americans,
China also ranks still behind the USA as a global power; it
remains to be seen whether, and how, this will change in the
future.
FOOTNOTE
1 See China-Latin America Finance Database at www.the-
dialogue.org/map_list.
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